Hussman's Hard Negative

I keep looking for something I can't get
Broken hearts lie all around me
And I don't see an easy way to get out of this
--Cutting Crew

Another weekly letter by John Hussman that contains several nuggets of insight. Right off the bat, he makes it clear that conditions have turned decisively negative, in his view.

The current situation is "characterized by an extremely unfavorable ensemble of conditions across valuations, sentiment, economic factors, and other conditions. Current conditions cluster with periods such as May 1962, October 1973, July 2001, and December 2007, all of which produced 10-20% market losses in extremely short order."

Dr J notes the increasing disparity between the leading indicators that his firm and ECRI tracks, which now signal an extremely high probability of US recession, and the prognostications of mainstream forecasters and pundits.

He notes some exchange between a Bloomber interviewer and ECRI's, Lakshman Achuthan:

Bloomber interviewer: [ECRI recently made] a recession call. What happened?
Achuthan: It's happening.

Suggests some serious cognitive dissonance out there regarding recession chances.

He also notes that the EU summit last week did (and can do) little to avert the central condition of credit crisis: solvency. Solvency is a shortfall between money owed and the resources needed to credibly repay it. Emphasis on 'credibly.' Printing money to pay back debts in devalued currency is not a credible strategy--at least in the eyes of creditors...

John suggests that perhaps one credible means for relieving stress in the EU is for countries to issue convertible sovereign bonds as they roll debt. The bonds would be convertible into the currency of the issuer at the option of the issuing government. Those countries with shaky fiscal houses would be required to pay a significant premium in order to compensate bond buyers for the commensurate risk.

Over time, John suggests, convertible debt might relieve the acute pressure that has built in the EU system. EU members would need to achieve sufficient financial credibility to remain in the EU system, lest they be subject to huge premiums on debt issued. The need for questionable bureaucratic enforcement mechanisms would be reduced. John suggests, "If the system can be saved, it will be saved" under such an arrangement.

One problem, of course, is that the significant discount that many EU countries currently enjoy by issuing debt under the implicit backing of the EU umbrella would vanish. Those countries would be forced to pay up and/or get their fiscal houses in order.

Market forces hate moral hazard...

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