Repos and QT

Then the door was opened
And the wind appeared
The candles blew
And then disappered
--Blue Oyster Cult

Interesting WSJ article suggesting that declining reserves stemming from the Fed's 'quantitative tightening' (QT) program poses a significant threat to financial markets. 

QT is the reverse of quantitative easing (QE). In QE, the Fed printed money out of thin air to buy bonds from banks. That printed money became 'reserves' that the banks have deposited with the Fed. Unsurprisingly, reserves have rocketed higher given the $9 trillion of bonds that the Fed now holds on its balance sheet via QE. 

Bank reserves serve various purposes. They can be used to settle trades with other banks. Reserves are also kept to satisfy regulatory requirements, which have generally been ratcheted higher since 2008, to provide some margin of safety in the event of another systemic credit event.

Reserves can also be used for investment purposes. One popular avenue toward this end is the repo market. Repos are contracts where one party sells securities to another party in exchange for cash. The buyer (who is engaging in what is called a 'reverse repo) promises to sell the securities back to the original holder at some future (usually near term) date and at a set (usually higher) price.

These pseudo loans help the pseudo borrowers manage short term cash obligations while providing the reverse repo pseudo lenders with quick profits.

When reserve levels are high then the 'interest rates' governing repos are low and usually in line with the Fed Funds Rate. However, when reserves decline, repo rates are prone to rise because there is less capacity for reverse repo 'lenders' to employ. 

As the Fed embarks on QT, reserves are beginning to fall. Although there are no signs yet of stress in the repo markets, there is belief that it is only a matter of time before problems surface. 

Indeed, in 2019, the Fed had to inject emergency shots of liquidity into these markets after previous QT programs resulted in skyrocketing repo rates that threatened to seize up money markets.

Given the size and centrality of money markets to contemporary market functioning, it may once again be time to fear the repo.

Cause for Pause

How can you just leave me standing
Along in a world that's so cold?
--Prince

Our working hypothesis is that the Fed will pivot from its hawkish track when 'something breaks' in the market. That's been the historical pattern and there's no reason to believe this time will be any different.

But where will the breakage occur this time around? One possibility is something in the credit markets. The greater the systemic leverage, the more susceptible the system is to higher interest rates. And systemic leverage has never been higher.

After the Fed's historic tightening over the past six months (on a relative basis), some folks are on the lookout for cracks in credit. We recently noted, for example, that low rated debt spreads are widening toward alarm levels.

Another possibility, one stressed here, is that a funding crisis arises in Washington. Higher rates mean more interest expense on ever-escalating federal debt levels. We're currently on a run rate to spend over $1 annually on Treasury bond interest. How much longer before politicians exert enough pressure on the Fed before it breaks?

Finally, one possibility that I frankly had not entertained concerns the strong dollar. The dollar index (DXY) currently stands at its highest level since 2002. The broader Bloomberg dollar index has spiked above the pandemic highs.

There is growing suspicion that this is sparking margin calls in emerging markets stemming from short dollar positions. 

If so, then systemic contagion could provide another possible cause for Fed pause.

Leveraged Loans

"The mother of all evils is speculation--leveraged debt."
--Gordon Gekko (Wall Street 2: Money Never Sleeps)

Leveraged loans are loans extended to entities that already have high levels of debt and/or poor credit history. Loans are usually arranged by at least one investment or commercial bank, and are often syndicated to other banks or institutions.

This article estimates the current value of leveraged loans outstanding at $1.4 trillion--nearly double the 2015 market size. I have read elsewhere that leveraged loans have become popular among college endowments and other institutional investors as high yielding alternative investments.

With that high yield, of course, comes higher risk. Leveraged loan borrowers are more prone to default. Indeed, the article also suggests that leveraged loans may be a useful 'canary in the coal mine' this time around as credit market stress builds.

We know that tight monetary policy moves are often lagged in their effects. The leveraged loan market may be a good place to look for manifestations of the Fed's previous actions.

Jackson's Hole

"You're the disease, and I'm the cure."
--Marion Cobretti (Cobra)

The much-awaited Jackson Hole speech from Fed chair Powell is now in the books. Personally, I always chuckle when Fed heads wax about economic problems that always seem to be exogenous, and the Fed's heroic role in taming them.

The topic this time around is, of course, inflation. Powell suggests that the Fed must draw upon 3 lessons learned. One is that the Fed must take on responsibility for delivering low and stable inflation. The obvious question is why should the Fed be responsible for delivering any rate of inflation at all? Moreover, if the Fed is responsible for delivering low inflation, then how did we get to this state of high inflation in the first place?

The second lesson learned related to 'inflation expectations.' Powell asserts that "if the public expects that inflation will remain low and stable over time, then, absent major shocks, it likely will. I found that statement particularly rich. It suggests that a major goal of 'fighting inflation' is persuasion--persuading the public that inflation is low. 

Never mind the decades of easy money compliments of the Fed.

The third lesson is that the Fed must keep at it until the job is done. That is, keep monetary policy restrictive until "inflation is down to the low and stable levels that were the norm until the spring of last year. But monetary policy was extraordinarily 'unrestrictive' for more than a decade before the spring of last year. 

If that prolonged period of easy money didn't unduly elevate the public's inflation expectations, then how will the Fed 'keeping at it' with restrictive monetary policy do the opposite?

Powell once again markets the Fed as the cure rather than the disease it is.

Lagged Effects

Take a chance like all dreamers

Can't find another way

You don't have to dream it all

Just live a day
--Duran Duran

Another insightful interview with Stephanie Pomboy. I find the Maven's focus on credit market fallout from the Fed's tightening program intuitive. In leveraged systems, rate hikes and tight money policies increase stress and lead to failure.

But, as Pomboy observes, the effects are often lagged. She points to recent trends from credit upgrades to downgrades, as well as a lender bankruptcy or two, as evidence since they come several months after the Fed began its tightening campaign.  

Recall the 2008 credit collapse. The Fed was raising rates in 2006 but it wasn't until early 2007 that the first substantial cracks started appearing. New Century Financial, anyone?

And then it took another year until the crescendo really started to build.

If Pomboy is correct, and I think she is, then additional data points that reflect credit market stress should be pending.

When the Going Gets Tough

I got something to tell you
I got something to say
--Billy Ocean

The two key charts, updated again. Fed funds rate, recessions/crises, and SPX.

QE, SPX, and related events.

When the going gets tough, what does the Fed do?

Redline Fed Lines

You'll never say hello to you
Until you get it on the redline overload
You'll never know what you can do
Until you get it up as high as you can go
--Kenny Loggins

Yesterday the FOMC raised the Fed funds rate 75 bips as telegraphed. The overnight rate target now stands at 2.25-2.50%.

As is common anymore, the FOMC statement was 'redlined' for wording changes from the previous statement.

The only substantial change was the first sentence, which went from discussing economic strength to signs of economic weakness.

Couple that with the subsequent statement that the Fed is prepared to adjust its policy stance if risks emerge that threaten the attainment of the committee's goals, and you get early signs of a dovish pivot.

Reaching? Perhaps, but markets are partying on the prospects thus far.

Undercover Hero?

My beacon's been moved
Under moon and star
Where am I to go
Now that I've gone too far?
--Golden Earring

I enjoy reading Tom Luongo's work. Thought provoking--even when his general premise is wrongheaded. 

In this recent piece, for example, Luongo gives the Fed entirely too much credit, arguing that the central bank is essentially the 'good guy'--battling inflation wrought by irresponsible fiscal policies that sent money to people in boxes during CV19. 

He fails to mention the Fed's long history of bailing out markets (and policymakers) when markets break, or of the central bank's $9 trillion of balance sheet assets purchased with money created at the click of a mouse. Because, as Friedman observed, inflation is always a creature of monetary policy, arguing that the Fed is somehow not the Dr Frankenstein that created our present monster seems a bit naive.

However, Luongo does make an interesting point toward the end of his article. He notes (correctly) that the Davos/World Economic Forum crowd would like to put an end to commercial banking, and put all monetary power in the hands of central banks--perhaps even in a one world central bank with digital currency-producing capacity.

He then suggests that, in the United States (and perhaps elsewhere), the Fed represents the interests of those commercial banks. As such, the Fed is motivated to break the EU-centric Davos/WEF threat to US commercial banks by raising rates, pounding the euro, and perhaps even driving the EU toward dissolution.

There's lots of holes in that argument--including the Fed's 'institutional obligations' both domestic and abroad--but interesting to ponder the 'undercover hero' thesis nonetheless.

Cruel Summer

Strange voice are saying
What did they say?
Thinks I can't understand
It's too close for comfort
This heat has got right out of hand
--Bananarama

Regional Fed data increasingly suggest that economic activity is quickly contracting. While this may be alleviating near term price pressure per policymaker goals, it also portends nasty political consequences.

As one respondent from the Texas survey commented, "November can't get here fast enough."

Don't Bet On It

They show you photographs of how your life should be
But they're just someone else's fantasy
--Styx

Policymakers seem to be betting that people would rather see inflation than recession. Current policies seek to curtail demand, lower wages, and raise unemployment--with the hope that these things will result in falling prices. 

And people are supposed to be happy with that outcome?

Don't bet on it.

I also wouldn't bet on the either/or proposition. What if it turns out that we get inflation and recession?

Zero Coherence

Maybe someday
Saved by zero
I'll be more together
--The Fixx

Earlier today the European Central Bank (ECB) raised its deposit rate 50 basis point to...zero. The ECB's deposit rate had been in negative territory since 2014, meaning that depositors essentially paid to keep their money in the central bank's vault.

This is also the first interest rate increase by the ECB since 2011.

Needless to say, monetary policy in Europe has been off the rails for quite some time.

To demonstrate that it hasn't suddenly been transformed into an institution with coherence, the ECB unleashed a blizzard of acronym-heavy programs, such as Transmissions Protection Mechanisms (TPI), designed to selectively buy bonds of struggling EU countries (e.g., Italy) to keep sovereign debt from imploding.

Thus, we have a central bank raising interest rates while continuing easy money policy using a quantitative easing (QE) transmission mechanism.

The ECB truly makes the Fed look smart.

On the QT

It happened one summer
It happened one time
It happened forever
For a short time
--Motels

Bank of America (BAC) analyst and former Fed staffer who has a good track record of predicting Fed policy shifts forecasts that the central bank's current quantitative tightening (QT) will be ended much sooner than expected. He thinks QT will cease in early 2023 with about $1 trillion in asset rolled off the Fed's balance sheet.

While consistent with what these pages have been suggesting, I'll pick the under on both. Sooner than early 2023 and less than $ trillion unwound.

position in BAC

9%+

Hundred dollar car note
Two hundred rent
I get a check on Friday
But it's already spent
--Huey Lewis & the News

Another 40 yr high CPI print. Measured consumer goods and services inflation came in at a higher than expected 9.1%.

Interestingly, commodities and their associated stocks are green on the news. Also, interest rate futures are now pricing in 'policy reversal' rate cuts by early 2023.

How long before those rate cut bets start tricking into late 2022?

Pendleton Act

"You guys think you're above the law. Well, you ain't above mine."
--Nico Toscani (Above the Law)

In July of 1881, President James Garfield was shot and killed by an attorney who was furious that the president did not give him a job in the new administration. Operating on the theory that it had to eliminate the system of patronage in government if it was to prevent future assassinations, Congress passed the Pendleton Act.

Signed into law by Chester A. Arthur in 1883, the Pendleton Act created a permanent civil service that could not be undone each election cycle. The administrative, or 'deep,' state was born.

The Constitution does not provide for a permanent class of bureaucrats that possess authority outside of the three branches of government. The Pendleton Act created a layer of statist imposition that the democratic process cannot control.

Perhaps the original intent was to make the civil service class apolitical, but it has become anything but. Indeed, any political party worth its salt would endeavor to place operatives inside the administrative state so that agendas could be advanced regardless of who is in office.

We have seen this in the spades over the past few years as partisans installed at the highest levels of agencies such as the CDC, EPA, DOJ, Federal Reserve, FBI, and CIA render decisions that favor particular political agendas.

I don't know whether the constitutionality of the Pendleton Act has ever been challenged in court. If not, then it should be. This week's West Virginia v. EPA SCOTUS ruling moves in that direction.

Meanwhile, people must continue to wake up to the reality that there is currently a fourth branch of the federal government, one that arguably possesses more power than the other three branches, that essentially operates at its own discretion, and that is largely untouchable by the ballot box.

Commitment to Stupidity

"He chose...poorly."
--Grail Knight (Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade)

The larger question for big government types is this: Have not the past couple of years demonstrated the sheer ineptitude of central planning?

Public health. War and sanctions. Economic and monetary policy. Et al.

Hayek called it the fatal conceit--the belief that bureaucrats in a room can choose better than billions of individuals.

Ongoing belief in central planning constitutes a genuine commitment to stupidity.

75 Bips

Hot summer streets
The pavements are burning
I sit around
Trying to smile
But the air is so heavy and dry
--Bananarama

After signaling thru their WSJ mouthpiece that they were considering a 75 basis pt fed funds rate increase, the FOMC followed thru on Wed. The last time the Fed did 75 bips was 1994. 

This puts the fed fund rate target at 1.75-2%.

The infamous 'dot plot' showing forecasts by FOMC members of future fed fund rates find them firmly above 3% by year end.

The Fed's miserable record in forecasting anything accurately makes taking these dot plot projections seriously pretty laughable. 

As these page have noted, all previous rate hike cycles end when something breaks. This is because of the increased systemic leverage that results from the previous easing cycle--which never allows interest rates to return to previous cycle highs. A recession usually follows, along with more easy money from the Fed.

How high will rates go before triggering the next recession? A review of history suggests we may not be far from the peak. Perhaps this 75 bip move pushes things over the edge.

The 3%+ dot plot forecasts seem destined to be wrong (again).

Updated Charts

You can make or break
You can win or lose
That's a chance you take
When the heat's on you
And the heat is on
--Glenn Frey

Updated version of two very important charts. The first is Fed funds rate and the SPX since 1980. What does this chart suggest about how for the Fed can raise before crying uncle?

The second is Fed balance sheet assets and the SPX since the onset of QE. What does this chart suggest about how much the Fed can unwind its balance sheet before crying uncle?

As we have asked before, when facing a choice between keeping money/credit in the system to keep markets from collapsing or removing money/credit from the system to fight inflation, the Fed will choose which option?

Yen Destruction

One day you feel quite stable
The next you're coming off the wall
But I think that you should warn me
If you start heading for a fall
--Saga

When leverage + money printing start going way wrong, the billiard balls begin careening around the table. One never knows where the blow ups will occur.

This time around, Japan is becoming an epicenter. Faced with unrelenting Bank of Japan (BOJ) intervention, the yen has been getting pounded and sits at 20+ yr lows. 

Now, with the 10 yr Japanese government bond (JGB) yield hitting the upper band tag in the BOJ's yield curve control program, the BOJ has bought about 1.5 trillion yen's worth of JGBs. If the pace continues through end of month, the BOJ will have purchased about 10 trillion yen's worth of bonds.

To put that in perspective, that would be the equivalent of the Fed doing more than $300 billion of QE when adjusted for GDP.

It is hard not to envision outright monetary collapse if the BOJ does not take its foot off the gas soon.

What that means for financial systems worldwide, as integrated as they are, is anyone's guess.

Futility of Saving

Who's gonna tell you when

It's too late?

Who's gonna tell you things

Aren't so great?
--The Cars

Nice graph (taken from this article) showing the futility of saving cash as a means to beat inflation. The inference is that cash hasn't covered cost of living increases in years.

This graph is conservative, given that inflation numbers under-report price increases. Stated differently, the actual ability of saving to cope with price inflation is significantly worse than suggested here.

What corresponds to the step changes down in earnings on savings? Easy Fed monetary policy that went into overdrive with the onset of the quantitative easing regime in 2009.

More Extremes

Dr Melissa Reeves: Why do you call Billy 'The Extreme?'
Dustin 'Dusty' Davis: Because Bill IS 'The Extreme!'
--Twister

More data points suggest that we're approaching noteworthy market extremes. Bank of America's (BAC) fund manager survey is touching crisis-level sentiment in both expectations for economic growth...

...and for profit growth.

On a separate front, credit default swaps on investment grade (IG) debt widening--approaching levels that have historically caused the Fed to pivot away from program intended to tighten monetary conditions.

I continue to sense that, although the Fed is talking tough, it will act far more dovishly than currently expected.

position in BAC