SCOTUScare

I'll pick up my guitar and play
Just like yesterday
And I'll get on my knees and pray
We won't get fooled again
--The Who

The primary goal of judicial process is arriving at and acting on the truth. Sometimes this does not occur. The process may be erroneous or incomplete which prohibits the truth from being obtained. Even if obtained, the truth may not be acted on due to either intentional or incompetent misbehavior.

In high courts, responsibility for arriving at and acting on the truth lies with a judge or panel of judges. A jury does not process evidence and render decision. Instead, it is the bench's duty to obtain the truth.

An institution that permits outsiders to evaluate the extent to which judges have upheld this responsibility when rendering decisions is the written opinion. High courts must explain their rationale in writing. If some judges dissent from majority opinion, then they are invited to put their counterarguments in writing.

As long as this institution remains, anyone can evaluate the extent to which judges have arrived at the truth when making decisions. The is because written opinions lay bare judicial reasoning. They expose errors in thought process and possibilities of judicial interest rather than disinterest. No amount of sophistry can obscure incomplete or erroneous judgment when a reasoning mind carefully examines written judicial opinion. As such, judges who fail to arrive at or act on truth have nowhere to hide when they write their arguments down. They can only hope that onlookers do not scrutinize their work.

By analyzing both the affirming and dissenting opinions in King v. Burwell, we can conclude that the majority of the Supreme Court has once again abdicated its truth-seeking process regarding the Affordable Care Act. Similar to his affirming opinion written three years ago, Chief Justice Roberts displays tortured rationale to justify why, under section 36 of the Act, health insurance sold on an "Exchange established by the State" actually means "Exchange established by the State the Federal Government."

In defense of his decision, Roberts offers various arguments involving the statute's context, design and purpose, and "inartful drafting." He also suggests that the decision is consistent with the principle of judicial restraint. His arguments are weak and at times preposterous, as demonstrated by the ease with which each of them is excoriated by dissenting Justice Scalia.

For example, with respect to the argument that the majority of the court is practicing judicial restraint in this case, it is easy to see that they are engaging in just the opposite--judicial activism. The court is rewriting the law by adding words that do not appear in the statute. As Scalia (p. 20) observes, the court's revision authorizes the IRS to collect billion$ in taxes on federal exchanges, it changes insurance prices for millions of Americans, reduces state participation in implementing the ACA, and expands the reach of the law's individual mandate.

A straightforward and wholly appropriate response consistent with judicial restraint would have been to send the law back to Congress so that it can hammer out the problems with the current statue. The legislative branch would thus be doing what it is supposed to do: write clear law--which by the Roberts majority's own admission the current statute is not.

It is easy to conclude that, similar to the case three years ago, Roberts is grasping at straws because he is interested. He wants the law to 'work' and he is willing to sacrifice the truth in doing so.

Near the end of his dissent, Scalia (p. 21) concludes as much, suggesting that because the majority of the court is rewriting law, effectively working in tandem with other branches of government rather than providing a constitutional check, in order for the health care program to work out as they hope, "We should start calling this law SCOTUScare."

Once again, the highest court in the land demonstrates how truth can been subjugated in favor of interest.