Why Can't We Cooperate? Pt II

Oh, that ain't working, that's the way you do it
Get your money for nothing, get your chicks for free
--Dire Straits

Previously we pondered our general unwillingness to work together on problems that have a national scope. Employing a market-based approach, we proposed that if the market for solving our nation's problems was truly unhampered, then lack of cooperation reflects absence of voluntary exchange between those with ideas about how to fix problems, and those that would need to execute potential solutions.

Simply put, buyers and sellers have yet to perceive mutual value when it comes to national problem solving, and a market has not yet been made that motivates voluntary cooperation in this regard.

This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, however, because the unhampered market assumption is questionable. Empirical evidence suggests that, contrary to the beliefs of many, large scale free markets generally don't exist in our country. And in the political domain, where many problems of national scope are positioned, it is absolutely certain that related markets operate under hampered conditions.

Political markets are hampered because property rights are not respected. Our current goverment structure permits politicians to confiscate resources from citizenry and redistribute them with discretion.

Rather than stimulating voluntary exchange, this situation creates a market for political favor where buyers, known as special interest groups (SIGs), seek to purchase resources from sellers, known as politicians. This constitutes a hampered market situation because resources for sale have been obtained by coercive means. Some of the exchanges are involuntary in nature.

Hampered markets for political favor are likely to crowd out unhampered markets for voluntary exchange with near certainty. This is because of the axiomatic Law of Parsimonny, which states that humans generally seek the greatest amount of satisfaction possible relative to the labor given up. In markets for political favor, it is possible for many individuals to acquire needs-satisfying resources by expending less effort than it would take to obtain those same resources thru productive labor and voluntary exchange.

Because markets for political favor offer the possibility of getting 'something for nothing,' human nature is likely to bid such markets up, while markets for voluntary exchange shrink from the scene.

The ramifications for broad cooperation should be apparent. Politicians broker involuntary exchange between parties who would not trade on similar terms if property rights were respected. SIGs form to increase bargaining power for confiscated resources. Other SIGs form to keep resources from being confiscated--particularly when democratic process provides an avenue for SIG operations.

Voluntary exchange diminishes as people seek to satisfy their needs via political channels. People are also busy trying to protect their property from confiscation.

Clearly this situation is not conducive to widespread voluntary cooperation.

This seems a reasonable answer to Jon Stewart's question. We can't work together as long as free markets are circumvented by markets for political favor.

Remove the power to confiscate resources from government's hands, and watch voluntary cooperation increase.