"I hate losses, sport. Nothing ruins my day more than losses."
--Gordon Gekko (Wall Street)
As strange as the past few months have been, there are actually theories that help explain the unusual behavior of people and policymakers. These pages have been documented a few. Let's review some of them here.
Social identity theory. Behavior of out-group members is criticized while behavior of in-group members is largely given a pass. Because leftists tend to be, by definition,
more collectivist, we should expect in-group/out-group norms to be more prevalent among those on the political left. Helps explain
division of CV19 discourse and
policies along political lines.
Institution theory. Institutions are rules and norms that exert pressure for sameness and compliance. Pressure for 'isomorphism' can be classified in one of three types: coercive (laws, regulations), normative (customs, common practices), mimetic (imitating behavior of others). Mimetic isomorphism is particularly prevalent in uncertain times--which helps explain
quick spreading policies such as lockdown and mask wearing.
Agency theory. Agents are supposed to work on behalf of their principals, but often pursue their own interests at the principals' expense--particularly when principals are unable to monitor/assess agent work. Helps explain
behavior of public health officials as well as efforts to
manipulate data to
hide error.
Resource dependence theory. Entities are rarely self-sufficient. Instead, they must trade with others to obtain resources necessary for survival and growth. Larger resource providers exert more power over smaller dependents. Helps explain why sectors highly dependent on government funding, such as health care, are
likely to fall in line with CV19 policy mandates.
Threat rigidity theory. Facing conditions of threat, individuals, groups, and organizations tend to do two things. One, they restrict information processing channels to reduce information overload and to economize attention on lessons learned from dealing with past threats. Two, they tighten control processes by centralizing decision making authority. These actions combine to rigidify response to threat. Creative solutions are shunned in favor of customary responses that worked well to quell previous threats. When the nature of the threat differs radically from previous episodes, then failing to consider novel responses results in a reinforcing loop of maladaptive behavior. This theory, coupled with the next one, says much about
collective response to a new virus.
Fast and slow thinking. People posses two decision making processes. System 1 is
emotional and reactive. Instead of deliberately processing information which takes time and effort, this 'fast thinking' processes makes snap decisions. The vast majority of decisions are made using fast thinking processes. System 2 is rational and data driven. It collects evidence and deliberates before deciding. This slow thinking process--the truly rational one--is rarely used. It is easy to surmise that most people have been engaging their fast thinking system 1 brains
when making sense of the CV19 pandemic and
associated policy responses.
Transaction cost economics. Econ 101 assumes that exchange is cost-free. In reality, 'transaction costs' accompany trade. Search, contracting, arbitration, translation, regulation. The higher the transaction costs, the less likely people trade on the market (outsource) with other specialists. Instead, they will pull more activities in-house (insource) and diversify. Higher transaction costs associated with CV19, particularly those
imposed by regulation (mask wearing, hand washing, sanitizing, spacing), are keeping people from trading with each other.
Prospect theory and
escalation of commitment. You plan out what seems like a great strategy. You begin implementing it. But it doesn't work. What to do? Rather than cut your losses and change course, you will be prone to keep going and perhaps even escalate your commitment. A key reason:
loss aversion. People
hate losses more than they like gains. This theory says much about why officials are
unlikely to reverse failing CV19 policies.
My sense is that these threads could be woven into an interesting theory of viral response.