Imitation Gone Awry

"Hey, check out the Dukes over there. They must know something. Let's get in on it."
--Floor trader (Trading Places)

Although institutions are commonly viewed as people (the president of the United States), places ('institutes of higher learning'), and even dates (holidays), institutions are better seen as laws, customs, and other norms produced, practiced, or symbolized by those 'things.' A primary, but certainly not singular, purpose of institutions is to provide a stable social backdrop for human interaction.

Institutions operate by exerting 'isomorphic' pressure for sameness in behavior. Per their seminal work, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) elaborated three types of isomorphic pressure: coercive ("Do this or go to jail"), normative ("This is how we do things around here"), and mimetic ("Follow the leader"). Although these categories are often useful for analytical purposes, they are often blended in practice.

A common hypothesis in institutional theory is that, when uncertainty rises in the environment, mimetic pressure often dominates the landscape. Simply stated, when people don't know what to do, they copy the behavior of others who they think might 'know' something.

There is certainly some validity to this premise. It is hard to dismiss that much of the behavior during the CV19 pandemic seems to be driven by mimetic isomorphic pressure. For example, once an influential organization decides to mandate vaccines, other organizations quickly do the same. People see others wearing masks, so they put masks on too.

Mimetic isomorphism can lead to obvious dysfunctionalities. Imitating others is the basis for herd behavior. The 'blind may be leading the blind'...perhaps over the cliff.

It seems plausible that mimetic isomorphism can only 'work' for so long. If copying the behavior of others doesn't produce positive results within a reasonable amount of time, then people will being to discard this strategy in favor of something else. Probably not all at once, but gradually as people slowly conclude that their imitation strategies are not producing desired results. 

People more prone to think for themselves are likely to be early dissenters and strike out in search of alternatives. Those alternatives may take the form of non-isomorphic behavior entirely. Entrepreneurship, innovation, et al. This is sometimes called 'active agency'--i.e., pursuing interests that do not align with prevailing institutions (Oliver, 1991).

Perhaps much of the pushback to the new round of CV19 mandates that we're currently witnessing results from active agency driven by imitation gone awry.

Reference

DiMaggio, P.S. & Powell, W.W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48: 147-160.

Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review, 16: 145-179.